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The Right to a Jury Trial in Actions for
Patent Infringement and Suits for
Declaratory Judgment
Brian D. Coggio
Timothy E. DeMasi*
INTRODUCTION
Whether a case is tried before a jury significantly affects the
patentee’s (and conversely, the alleged infringer’s) likelihood of
success.1
Accordingly, both parties are entitled to know
definitively when a Seventh Amendment2 right to a jury trial
exists.3 Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
has not provided clear guidance on this question, and the few
decisions on point, while applying the same constitutional analysis,
*

Mr. Coggio is a partner in the New York City office of Orrick, Herrington &
Sutcliffe LLP. Mr. DeMasi is a partner in the New York City office of Pennie &
Edmonds LLP. The authors wish to thank Kristin Smith, a 2002 summer associate at
Pennie & Edmonds, for her assistance in the preparation of this Article. The views
expressed herein are solely those of the authors. This Article does not express the views
of the firms of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe LLP or Pennie & Edmonds LLP, or any
lawyer or client of either firm.
1
See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000).
2
The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides for the right to a
jury trial in suits at common law. U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also James Fleming, Jr.,
Right to a Jury Trial in Civil Actions, 72 YALE L.J. 655 (1963); infra note 19 and
accompanying text.
3
See generally Margaret L. Moses, What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s
Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 183 (2000); Greg
J. Michelson, Did the Markman Court Ignore Fact, Substance, and the Spirit of the
Constitution in Its Rush Toward Uniformity?, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1749 (1997); Allen
N. Littman, The Jury’s Role in Determining Key Issues in Patent Cases: Markman,
Hilton Davis and Beyond, 37 IDEA 207 (1997); Gregory D. Leibold, In Juries We Do
Not Trust: Appellate Review of Patent-Infringement Litigation, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 623
(1996).
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have reached inconsistent results.4 The court first examined the
right to a jury trial in In re Lockwood5 and more recently in Tegal
Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.6 In both opinions, the court
began by discussing the Supreme Court’s test for determining if a
right to a jury attaches to an action. According to the Federal
Circuit, the Supreme Court concluded that the right to a jury
depends on both the nature of the action and the remedy sought.7
With respect to statutory patent actions, the court further observed
that the analysis has two steps: “First, we compare the statutory
action to 18th century actions brought in the courts of England
prior to the merger of the courts of law and equity. Second, we
examine the remedy sought and determine whether it is legal or
equitable in nature.”8
In eighteenth century England, claims of patent infringement
could be raised in actions at law or in suits in equity.9 Where a
patentee sought only damages, the patentee brought an action at
law and the action was tried before a jury.10 If, on the other hand,
a patentee sought only to enjoin acts of infringement, the patentee
could only bring a suit in equity.11 In that latter instance, the
action would be tried before the bench.12 The court noted that
nineteenth century American practice followed the same basic
4

In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines v.
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995) (holding plaintiff patentee is entitled to have the issue
of validity tried to a jury “as a matter of right”); Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Am., Inc.,
257 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding no right to jury trial where equitable relief
requested and only affirmative defenses raised); In re SGS-Thomson Microelectronics,
35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (nonprecedential opinion) (also holding
plaintiff patentee is entitled to have the issue of validity tried to a jury “as a matter of
right”). See generally Brian D. Coggio & Timothy E. DeMasi, The Right to a Jury Trial
Under The Waxman-Hatch Act: The Question Revisited and Resolved, 57 FOOD & DRUG
L.J. 155 (2002).
5
50 F.3d at 966.
6
257 F.3d at 1331.
7
See id. at 1339; Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972.
8
Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 972 (quoting Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558,
565 (1990) (quoting Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417–18 (1987))); see also Tegal,
257 F.3d at 1339–41.
9
Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1340; Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976.
10
Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1340; Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976.
11
Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1340; Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976.
12
Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976.
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pattern.13 Thus, under both English and American practice, it was
the patentee who decided whether a jury would be permitted by the
nature of the remedy sought.14
The same result should apply today: The right to a jury trial
should be determined by the patentee’s choice of remedy. When a
patentee sues for infringement and seeks damages, the case may be
tried before a jury. However, if a patentee either has no claim for
damages or foregoes that claim, no right to a jury exists, even if the
defendant interposes counterclaims seeking declarations of
invalidity and non-infringement. Lastly, because a declaratory
judgment suit is simply an inversion of a patent infringement
action,15 the same result should apply. If a patentee asserts an
infringement counterclaim seeking damages, the case may be tried
to a jury; if the patentee either cannot or does not seek damages,
the case must be heard by a court.16
This Article addresses various situations that arise in typical
patent disputes. Part I briefly examines Seventh Amendment
jurisprudence and the historical interpretation of the right to a jury
trial. Part II explores patent infringement actions where damages
are unavailable and concludes that, in those situations, there is no
right to a jury trial.17 Part III analyzes Seventh Amendment rights
13

Id.
See Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1341 (As for the second step of the analysis, the court
observed that an injunction is a purely equitable remedy.).
15
Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 980.
16
The court, with the consent of both parties, may order a trial with a jury whose
verdict will have the same effect as if the trial by jury had been a matter of right. See FED.
R. CIV. P. 39(c).
17
See Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 00-C5791, 2001 WL 1246628, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 16, 2001) (striking defendant’s jury request because an action instituted
under the Hatch-Waxman Act is equitable in nature); Pfizer Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., No.
00-C1475, 2001 WL 477163, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 3, 2001) (declining to find a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial in Hatch-Waxman actions). Although certain cases
supporting the authors’ conclusion were decided under the Hatch-Waxman Act, these
decisions are instructive on the right to a jury trial in more typical actions for patent
infringement. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 68b–c, 70b (1994); 21 U.S.C.
§ 301 note 355, 360cc (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1994); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271, 282
(1994)). See also Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex Inc., No. 02-C2255, 2002 WL 1917871
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2002) (stating that the Federal Circuit has not yet addressed the issue
of a right to a jury trial where the counterclaims arise in Hatch-Waxman cases, but
14

4-COGGIO FORMAT

208

12/12/02 4:28 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:205

in patent infringement actions where damages are available but
not sought, and no counterclaims are asserted, and concludes that
the parties are not entitled to a jury absent a claim for damages.
Part IV concludes that the assertion of a declaratory judgment
counterclaim in a patent infringement action does not affect the
right to a jury. Part V analyzes suits for declaratory judgments and
concludes that the right to a jury trial is again determined by the
patentee’s choice of remedy.18
I. THE SEVENTH AMENDMENT IS LIMITED TO ACTIONS AT LAW
In civil actions, including those involving patents, the right to a
jury trial is controlled by the constitutional mandate of the Seventh
Amendment.19 Limiting its application to “suits at common
law,”20 the Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial for those

holding that such counterclaims do not give rise to a right to a jury trial.); Brian D.
Coggio & Sandra A. Bresnick, The Right to a Jury Trial Under the Waxman-Hatch Act,
52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 259 (1997).
18
In analyzing the right to a jury trial, the authors recognize that the Supreme Court in
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962) reversed the earlier rule that an action that sought both monetary
damages and equitable relief was predominantly equitable and therefore was not tried to a
jury. See also 5 MARTIN L. ADELMAN, PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 7.6[2.-1] (1996). See
generally Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 980–90 (Nies, J., dissenting); Tights Inc. v. Stanley, 441
F.2d 336, 341–44 (4th Cir. 1971); Kennedy v. Lakso Co., 414 F.2d 1249, 1252–53 (3d
Cir. 1969). Moreover, the present analysis intentionally avoids discussion of the writ of
scire facis as well as the public rights and the issue of law exceptions to the Seventh
Amendment as unnecessary to the authors’ ultimate conclusions.
19
Specifically, the Seventh Amendment provides: “In suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be
preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
20
Id.
The phrase “common law,” found in [the Seventh Amendment], is used in
contradistinction to equity, and admiralty, and maritime jurisprudence . . . . By
common law, [the Seventh Amendment’s framers] meant what the constitution
denominated in the third article “law”; not merely suits, which the common law
recognized among its old and settled proceedings, but suits in which legal
rights were to be ascertained and determined, in contradistinction to those
where equitable rights alone were recognized, and equitable remedies were
administered . . . . In a just sense, the amendment then may well be construed
to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction,
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actions that in 1971 created legal rights and remedies enforceable
in a court of law.21 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure echo the
Seventh Amendment’s instruction, reiterating the parties’ right to a
jury trial of all issues unless the court “finds that a right of trial by
jury of some or all of those issues does not exist under the
Constitution or statutes of the United States.”22 In short, the scope
of the Seventh Amendment extends only to the adjudication of
legal, not equitable, rights.23 As a result, parties to patent
infringement actions cannot insist upon a trial by jury absent a
claim that seeks legal relief.24
Given that the Seventh Amendment embraces only actions
based on legal rights and remedies, issues must be characterized as
either legal or equitable before a jury trial is allowed. To
determine whether a claim presents legal rights for a jury’s
determination or equitable rights for the court’s review, two
specific factors are evaluated.25 First, the pending action is
whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal
rights.
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446–47 (1830) (emphasis added).
21
Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193–95 (1974) (holding that a court must honor a
party’s jury demand where factual issues concerning legal rights and remedies require a
trial). See also Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 382–83 (1974) (holding that
where an action involves rights and remedies recognized at common law, the parties’
right to a jury trial must be preserved).
22
FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a)(2).
23
See Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417 (1987).
24
But see 28 U.S.C. §§ 211–216 (repealed 1982) (trial of issues of fact in equity in
patent causes). By way of illustration, the use of juries in patent-related claims has
developed significantly since this statute, quoted below, was applicable:
District courts, when sitting in equity for the trial of patent causes, may impanel
a jury of not less than five and not more than twelve persons, subject to such
general rules in the premises as may, from time to time, be made by the
Supreme Court, and submit to them such questions of fact arising in such cause
as such district court shall deem expedient and the verdict of such jury shall be
treated and proceeded upon in the same manner and with the same effect as in
the case of issues sent from chancery to a court of law and returned with such
findings.
Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 77, § 2, 18 Stat. 316.
25
The Court blurred the dual nature of this historical test in Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), and overlooked all references to the test’s remedy
prong. Nevertheless, the Markman Court’s analysis specifically noted a prior decision
that properly cited both factors of the historical test. Id. at 377 (citing Tull, 481 U.S. at
426).
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equated to its closest eighteenth century analog brought in courts
of England26 prior to the merger of law and equity.27 Second, the
requested relief is analyzed and classified as either legal or
equitable.28 The nature of the requested relief is widely viewed as
the more important of the two criteria.29 In addition, where neither
a precise historical analog can be ascertained nor the available
precedent be applied to the claims at issue, the limited abilities of
juries may also be scrutinized.30
Despite its seemingly straightforward inquiry, application of
this two-part test has proven more difficult than one might have
envisioned. For example, the merger of courts of law and equity in
the early 1930s complicated the analysis considerably. After the
merger, courts were presented with cases combining related claims
for legal and equitable relief, creating confusion as to where legal
and equitable claims diverged, if at all. In an attempt to clarify the
mandate of the historical test, the Supreme Court opined that the
nature of the issues controlled the nature of the underlying action
and if both legal and equitable issues were present, a jury trial, was

26
Much like today, in eighteenth century England, a plaintiff patentee was the master
of both the choice of forum and nature of the remedy in patent infringement actions.
Specifically, depending on the remedy requested, allegations of patent infringement could
be raised either in actions at law or in suits in equity. Thus, if the patentee sought only
monetary relief, the patentee would bring an action at law. Then, where requested,
affirmative defenses of invalidity were assessed by a jury. See Battin v. Taggert, 58 U.S.
75 (17 How.) 74 (1854). Conversely, where a plaintiff patentee, faced with only past acts
of infringement, sought to enjoin future infringement, the patentee could only bring suit
in equity. Under these circumstances, the affirmative defense of invalidity was
traditionally tried to the bench. See Root v. Railway Co., 105 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1881).
27
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193–94 (1974).
28
See id.
29
See Chauffeurs Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Tull, 481 U.S. at
421 (characterizing the requested relief as “‘[m]ore important’ than finding a precisely
analogous common-law cause of action in determining whether the Seventh Amendment
guarantees a jury trial.” (quoting Curtis, 415 U.S. at 196)).
30
See Markman, 517 U.S. at 388–90; Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,
42 n.4 (1989) (listing practical abilities and limitations of juries as an additional factor to
be consulted in determining whether the Seventh Amendment conveys a right to a jury
trial); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970) (including the practical abilities
and limitations of juries among the factors of consideration when applying the historical
test).
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if requested, mandatory.31 Soon after, the Court further extended
the right to a jury trial for legal issues once considered merely
incidental to equitable claims and held that the jury trial must
precede a trial of related issues to the bench.32
The development of civil actions unknown at common law and
thus considered neither legal nor equitable in nature only added to
the complexities (and confusion) concerning the right to a jury
trial. The advent of the declaratory judgment action, for example,
provided accused infringers with a procedural defense to a
patentee’s charge of infringement and provided courts with yet
another type of action to classify under the legal-equitable rubric.
Ultimately, courts concluded that the filing of a declaratory
judgment action seeking an equitable remedy prior to the assertion
of legal counterclaims does not eliminate the Seventh Amendment
right to have legal claims tried by a jury.33 The difficult question
remained, however: What are “legal” claims that can be tried to a
jury? The following sections address typical scenarios that arise in
patent disputes, providing a simple, straightforward solution to this
complex problem.
II. WHERE A PATENTEE HAS A RIGHT ONLY TO EQUITABLE RELIEF,
THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
An action in which an accused infringer sought a declaratory
judgment of invalidity and the patentee counterclaimed for only a
permanent injunction against threatened infringement, Shubin v.
United States District Court,34 necessitated the Ninth Circuit’s
review of the right to a jury trial in a patent case lacking a request

31
See Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 504 (1959) (reasoning that in
cases requesting both legal and equitable relief in addition to a jury trial on legal claims,
all issues common to both types of claims were first to be tried to a jury).
32
See Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 473 n.8 (1962) (“As long as any legal
cause is involved the jury rights it creates control.”).
33
See Barry S. Wilson, Patent Invalidity and the Seventh Amendment: Is the Jury Out?,
34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1787, 1800 (1997) (“Filing a declaratory judgment for an
equitable action prior to filing legal counterclaims does not eliminate the . . . right to have
a jury decide the legal claims.” (citing Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 504)).
34
313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963).
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for monetary damages.35 After examining the pleadings, the court
emphasized that the patentee neither specified a damages amount
nor suffered any actual infringement upon which damages could
have been based.36 With only threatened infringement asserted,
the court found that “no possibility [existed] that damages could be
awarded, or that an accounting could become necessary or
possible.”37 Consequently, absent a claim for damages, the action
was equitable and only afforded the patentee the possibility of an
equitable remedy.38 As a result, the Shubin court held that the
patentee, presenting a “purely equitable claim,”39 was not entitled
to a jury trial on either the accused infringer’s or the patentee’s
declaratory judgment claims.40
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the patentee’s claim underlines
the authors’ ultimate conclusion that the right to a jury trial in
35

See id. at 250.
See id. at 251. The Shubin court did not fail to recognize that a legal issue triable
before a jury could very well exist in an action in which a patentee claimed damages for
infringement, noting that “[i]f we examine the pleadings before us alone, they indicate
that there could exist an issue at law, i.e., damage for infringement.” Id. (emphasis
added). The case, however, as emphasized by the Shubin court, differed in that “[n]o
amount of damage [was] specified,” and “no prayer for damages in any amount” was
asserted. Id. See also Beaunit Mills, Inc. v. Eday Fabric Sales Corp., 124 F.2d 563 (2d
Cir. 1942) (reiterating that “on issues of patent infringement, a jury trial may be had
under a claim for damages only, as distinguished from a claim for injunction and
accounting of profits”) (citations omitted).
37
Shubin, 313 F.2d at 251. In short, because the parties stipulated that infringement
had yet to occur, the patentee could not have sought damages. However, if instances of
actual infringement were to occur during the course of the proceedings, the patentee
could later assert a claim for damages, thus entitling him or her to a trial by jury. For
example, in Beaunit Mills, the Second Circuit opined that where an equitable action later
develops legal issues, “the question of jury trial will have to be determined in the light of
the then status of the case.” 124 F.2d at 566. See also infra Part III (discussing the
evolving legal and equitable claims in Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc., 257
F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) and their effect on the parties’ right to a jury trial).
38
The court succinctly illustrated this position, and clearly characterized the patentee’s
cause of action, explaining: “[D]efendants seek only a permanent injunction against
threatened infringement. This is not a legal issue. Defendants’ only remedy would be in
equity.” Shubin, 313 F.2d at 251 (emphasis added). See also Beaunit Mills, 124 F.2d at
565 (approving the trial judge’s denial of a jury trial where the claim “is framed along
equitable lines looking to injunctive relief” and “presenting equitable issues only”).
39
Shubin, 313 F.2d at 252.
40
See id. The Shubin decision also supports the authors’ opinion that the right to a jury
trial in declaratory judgment actions depends solely on the nature of the relief requested
by the patentee. See also infra Part V.
36
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typical patent disputes lies within the sole control of the patentee.
For example, the Shubin court analyzed the “sort of action the
defendant patentee could have brought at common law”41 to
determine the right to a jury trial and found that the patentee’s
claims were firmly rooted in equity. Because the patentee did not
and, in fact, could not seek monetary damages, the action was
purely equitable, and the patentee therefore was not entitled to
jury.42
Following the reasoning of Shubin, the Federal Circuit in
Lockwood, discussed below, similarly concentrated on the type of
action the patentee could have brought at common law.43 The
Lockwood court specifically noted that both parties in Shubin
stipulated that no infringement had occurred, significantly limiting
the patentee’s possible relief.44 Indeed, the Federal Circuit insisted
that Shubin was easily distinguished from Lockwood because “no
claim for damages could have been brought” by the patentee in
Shubin.45
The previous statement shows the Federal Circuit’s
endorsement of the conclusion that where a patentee has no right to
monetary damages, it is not entitled to a jury. Accordingly, the
decisions of other circuit courts that equitable claims do not
provide a right to trial by jury, coupled with the imprimatur of the
Federal Circuit, support the authors’ conclusion. Indeed, various
district courts have held that the lack of damages in actions
instituted under the Hatch-Waxman Act negates the possibility of a

41

Shubin, 313 F.2d at 250.
See Shubin, 313 F.2d at 251–52; Filmon Process Corp. v. Sirica, 379 F.2d 449, 451
(D.C. Cir. 1967).
43
See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 977 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines
v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
44
Id. In Lockwood, the Federal Circuit emphasized that, in Shubin, the “patentee’s
counterclaim for a permanent injunction against future infringement, paired with its
stipulation to the absence of any claim for infringement damages, convinced the court
that the issues in the case were purely equitable ones.” Id. (discussing Shubin, 313 F.2d at
250).
45
Id. (emphasis added). In contrast, the Lockwood patentee could have sought (and did
seek) both monetary and equitable relief. See id. at 968. Thus, Lockwood instituted a
legal action and requested a jury trial.
42
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jury trial.46 In sum, where a patentee is only entitled to equitable
relief, that patentee (or its adversary) is not entitled to a jury.
III. WHERE A PATENTEE DOES NOT SEEK MONETARY DAMAGES
AND COUNTERCLAIMS OF INVALIDITY OR NON-INFRINGEMENT ARE
NOT ASSERTED, THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL
In Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.,47 the Federal
Circuit held that where the patentee sought only injunctive relief
(although damages were available) and the defendant did not assert
counterclaims, neither party had a right to a jury trial.48 There, the
patentee, Tegal, sued Tokyo Electron American, Inc. (TEA) for
patent infringement, sought both damages and an injunction, and
requested a jury.49 TEA asserted affirmative defenses of invalidity
and non-infringement, but did not counterclaim.50 Six days before
trial, Tegal dropped its request for damages with the understanding
that “by withdrawing its damages claim, it would lose its right to a
trial by jury.”51 Tegal then moved to withdraw its request for a jury
trial, which TEA opposed. The district court agreed with Tegal,
holding that a right to a jury trial no longer existed.52
46
See, e.g., Pfizer Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., No. 00 C 1475, 2001 WL 477163, at *1
(N.D. Ill. May 3, 2001); Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., Inc., No. 99-2181, 2000 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20718, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 23, 2000); Glaxo Wellcome Inc. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc.,
45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1702, 1703 (D.N.J. 1997). See generally Brian D. Coggio &
Timothy E. DeMasi, The Right to a Jury Trial Under The Waxman-Hatch Act: The
Question Revisited and Resolved, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 155 (2002).
47
257 F.3d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
48
The authors submit that Tegal casts doubt on the continuing validity of Lockwood.
Accord 5 ADELMAN, supra note 18, § 7.6[2.-1]18, at 7-218.35 (noting that “[Tegal] is
squarely contrary to the Federal Circuit’s holding in Lockwood”).
49
See Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1338.
50
The defendant’s failure to assert any counterclaims was apparently significant to the
Federal Circuit in that this fact is repeated throughout the Tegal opinion. The court’s
emphasis of the lack of counterclaims made it possible, at least implicitly, to distinguish
Lockwood.
51
Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1338.
52
Id. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that “[a] demand for trial by jury
made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties.” FED.
R. CIV. P. 38(d). Thus, TEA argued that Tegal could not withdraw its request. The
Federal Circuit recognized, however, that Tegal did not merely withdraw its request for a
jury trial, but, by withdrawing its claim for monetary damages, Tegal destroyed the
constitutional basis for the right of either party to request a jury. Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1338.
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed and held that a
defendant that asserts only affirmative defenses does not have a
right to a jury trial where the patentee seeks only an injunction.53
The opinion is significant for various reasons. First, it would
appear that in Tegal, the plaintiff, unlike the cases discussed in the
prior section, had a right to damages, but voluntarily waived that
right. Thus, the court’s decision implicitly recognized that the
patentee’s choice of remedy controlled both parties’ right to a jury
trial (at least where no counterclaims were asserted). Second, the
wording of the Federal Circuit’s opinion suggests that Tegal
withdrew its damages claim to avoid a jury trial. Again, this
emphasizes that the patentee, regardless of its motives, dictates the
ultimate trier of fact. Third, the court recognized that the issue of
patent validity, although classified as “legal,” did not necessarily
require a jury trial.54
The Federal Circuit based its analysis on Lockwood, finding
that even though that opinion had been vacated by the Supreme
Court55 its reasoning was still pertinent. Relevant to the issue in
Tegal was Lockwood’s explanation that “[i]n eighteenth century
England, allegations of patent infringement could be raised in both
actions at law and suits in equity,” and that the choice of forum
depended on the type of remedy sought by the patentee.56 This, in
turn, controlled the right to a jury trial. If an injunction were
sought, the patentee filed suit in a court of equity; conversely, if
the patentee sought damages, the action was filed in a court of law.
Applying that framework to the facts in Tegal, the Federal Circuit
concluded that because Tegal sought only an injunction, in
eighteenth century England, it would have been required to bring
its suit in equity. Thus, neither party had a right to a jury.57

53

Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1341.
Contra In re SGS-Thomson Microelectronics, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (nonprecedential opinion). See 5 ADELMAN, supra note 18, § 7.6[2.-1], at 7-218.34.
55
Since Lockwood was vacated, its precedential value had been eliminated. See L.A.
County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979); O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
577–78 n.12 (1975); W.Y. Moberly, Inc. v. United States, 924 F.2d 232, 236 (Fed. Cir.
1991).
56
Tegal, 257 F.3d at 1340 (quoting Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976).
57
Id. at 1341.
54
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In Tegal, the Federal Circuit repeatedly distinguished
affirmative defenses of invalidity and non-infringement from
counterclaims seeking the same relief.58 The authors do not discern
any difference between the two for purposes of a Seventh
Amendment right to a jury trial.59 Nor does Tegal articulate any
such difference.60 In fact, in its original (but later vacated)
Lockwood decision, the Federal Circuit held that a right to a jury
trial existed because the action sought damages for patent
infringement, a legal remedy based on legal rights.61 More
significantly, however, the court stated that “the existence of a
counterclaim for a declaratory judgment of invalidity does not
alter the nature of the issues, rights or the remedy sought in the
infringement suit brought by Lockwood.”62 In its second
Lockwood decision, the Federal Circuit altered its views and
concluded that the existence of a counterclaim for invalidity does
alter the nature of the case and the right to a jury trial.63 The
authors respectfully disagree.

58

See id. at 1339, 1341. Interestingly, in its original decision in In re Lockwood, 30
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1292, 1293 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished), the Federal Circuit
noted that the defendant’s declaratory judgment counterclaim “adopted all of the grounds
for invalidity pled as defenses to Lockwood’s infringement suit.” This would indicate
that the “nature” of the case to be adjudicated did not change by denoting affirmative
defenses as counterclaims.
59
See Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., No. 00 C 5791, 2001 WL 1246628, at *5
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 12, 2001) (“The mere fact that invalidity has been raised in a counterclaim
rather than in an affirmative defense does nothing to change this characterization.”). For
further analysis of declaratory judgment actions, see infra Part V.
60
The Tegal court’s emphasis on the remedy sought by the patentee supports the
authors views, discussed in Part V, infra, regarding declaratory judgment actions.
Indeed, it would have been instructive had the Federal Circuit articulated even one reason
why the presence or absence of counterclaims for declarations of invalidity or noninfringement (which did not exist at common law) dramatically changed the analysis and,
in fact, changed the result in Tegal from that in Lockwood.
61
Lockwood, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
62
Id. (emphasis added).
63
In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines v.
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
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IV. WHERE A PATENTEE DOES NOT SEEK MONETARY DAMAGES,
THERE IS NO RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL, EVEN WHERE
COUNTERCLAIMS SEEKING DECLARATIONS OF INVALIDITY AND
NON-INFRINGEMENT ARE ASSERTED
The authors realize that their conclusion on this issue is
contradicted by the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Lockwood and
SGS-Thomson.64 The authors respectfully submit that both
opinions are incorrect. While a brief summary of both decisions is
helpful, it is instructive to begin by reviewing the role of
declaratory judgment counterclaims in patent infringement
litigation, a key to a proper understanding of Lockwood.
To some extent, the benefits of declaratory judgment
counterclaims mirror the benefits of the declaratory judgment
procedure. Professor Borchard acknowledged the utility of such
counterclaims in a section of his treatise entitled “Counterclaims”:
Reference has been made to one of the great evils that had
clustered around the patent monopoly in the form of the
opportunity afforded to the patentee to harass competitors,
alleged infringers and their customers by threatening to sue
or actually suing and then moving to dismiss any time
before trial, leaving his claims under the patent
unadjudicated. Yet the infringer had no opportunity to
insist on adjudication until 1934, when the action for a
declaratory judgment of invalidity or non-infringement
afforded him a remedy. Patentees actually commencing an
infringement suit can furthermore now be prevented from
arbitrarily discontinuing, provided the defendant files a
petition for a counterclaim of invalidity or noninfringement, a pleading which insures an adjudication
even should the plaintiff patentee move to dismiss.65
Thus, a patentee’s threat of suit could be redressed by instituting an
action for a declaratory judgment of invalidity or noninfringement. Moreover, if a patentee commences an infringement
64

But see Glaxo Group, 2001 WL 1246628, at *5 (“The mere fact that invalidity has
been raised in a counterclaim rather than in an affirmative defense does nothing to change
this characterization [of the right to a jury trial].”).
65
EDWIN BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 812 (2d ed. 1941).
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action, the assertion of a counterclaim, as opposed to mere
affirmative defenses, would prevent the patentee from dismissing
the case and reinstituting the action at a later date.66 Despite the
protections of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a) regarding
voluntary dismissals,67 declaratory judgment counterclaims still
protect the accused infringer from abuses by the patentee.68 Yet, it
has been recognized that counterclaims seeking “only a declaratory
judgment that the patent is invalid and uninfringed . . . would not,
of itself, entitle either party to a jury trial of the issues.”69
As such, a counterclaim for invalidity or non-infringement
does not affect the nature of the action in any way except to
prevent the matter from remaining undecided if a plaintiff-patentee
withdraws the suit.70 The counterclaim, in this context, does not
contribute a new or additional issue to be tried to a jury.71 This
result is not altered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Cardinal
Chemical Co. v. Morton International Inc.,72 in which the Court
criticized the practice of the Federal Circuit in failing to review
lower court holdings of invalidity if, on appeal, the patent were
held not to be infringed.73 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has
confirmed that Cardinal is irrelevant to the present discussion.74

66

Professor Borchard explores this in vivid detail. See id. at 812–17. See also Van Alen
v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 43 F. Supp. 833, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 1942).
67
The dismissal by the patentee is without prejudice “except that a notice of dismissal
operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once
dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including
the same claim.” FED. R. CIV. P. 41(a).
68
See BORCHARD, supra note 65, at 814–15.
69
Protexol Corp. v. Koppers Co., 12 F.R.D. 7, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
70
See id.
71
See Van Alen, 43 F. Supp. at 835.
72
508 U.S. 83 (1993).
73
See id. at 83.
74
See Super Sack Mfg. Corp. v. Chase Packaging Corp., 57 F.3d 1054, 1060 (Fed. Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1093 (1996).
In other words, according to Cardinal, a claim for a declaratory judgment of
invalidity is independent of patentee’s charge of infringement in the
following—and only the following—way: an affirmed finding of
noninfringement does not, without more, justify a reviewing court’s refusal to
reach the trial court’s conclusion on invalidity.
Id.
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The leading Federal Circuit decision addressing the right to a
jury in situations where counterclaims for declaratory judgment of
invalidity or non-infringement are asserted is Lockwood.75 There,
the patentee, Lockwood, instituted a patent infringement action
against American Airlines (American), alleging that the defendant
infringed two patents. Lockwood sought damages, an injunction,
and a jury.
American asserted affirmative defenses and
counterclaims for declaratory judgments of non-infringement and
invalidity. After discovery, the district court granted American’s
motion for summary judgment of non-infringement and ordered
that the case proceed solely on American’s counterclaim for a
declaratory judgment of invalidity. On American’s motion, the
district court struck Lockwood’s demand that invalidity be tried to
a jury.
The Federal Circuit granted Lockwood’s petition for a writ of
mandamus and directed the district court to reinstate Lockwood’s
jury demand.76 The court began its analysis by observing that the
Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to a jury in the
adjudication of legal as opposed to equitable rights. To determine
whether a particular statutory action resolves legal or equitable
rights, courts must compare the statutory action to eighteenth
century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the
merger of law and equity, as well as the nature of the remedy
sought. The court confirmed that in eighteenth century England, as
previously noted, allegations of patent infringement could be
raised in both actions at law and suits in equity, depending on the
patentee’s choice of remedy. If the patentee sought damages, the
patentee brought an action at law and the issue of validity would be
tried to a jury. The Federal Circuit reasoned that it could not,
consistent with the Seventh Amendment, deny Lockwood that
same choice merely because the validity of his patents was raised
in a declaratory judgment counterclaim rather than as an
75

In its original decision in In re Lockwood, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1292, 1293 n.1
(Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished), the court apparently believed that Lockwood’s claim for
damages was still viable. In large measure, this was the basis of the Federal Circuit’s
decision holding that a right to a jury trial existed.
76
See In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 980 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines
v. Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
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affirmative defense to infringement.
The court, therefore,
concluded that Lockwood was entitled to have the factual issues
relating to validity tried to a jury.77
In Lockwood, the court correctly recognized that declaratory
judgment actions (and apparently counterclaims for declaratory
judgment) are neither legal nor equitable. To decide the jury issue,
therefore, courts must determine how patent validity was
adjudicated prior to the merger of law and equity.78 In its search
for a historical analog, the Federal Circuit stated that “[i]nsofar as
the validity of the patents is adjudicated, American’s action
resembles nothing so much as a suit for patent infringement in
which the affirmative defense of invalidity has been pled, and
Lockwood’s right to a jury trial must be determined
accordingly.”79 The Lockwood court continued that the “primary
difference between American’s action and the infringement suit
that would formerly have been required for an adjudication of
validity is that the parties’ positions here have been inverted, and
such an inversion cannot operate to frustrate Lockwood’s Seventh
Amendment rights.”80 Because Lockwood’s infringement claim
had been dismissed, the authors submit that the closer eighteenth
century analog would have been an action for patent infringement
in which damages were not sought, but invalidity was raised—by
necessity—as an affirmative defense rather than as a counterclaim.
In that situation, Tegal holds that a right to a jury trial does not
exist.81
The Lockwood court recognized that under both English and
American practice, it was the patentee who decided “in the first
77

In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 980.
Id. at 973.
79
Id. at 974 (emphasis added).
80
Id. at 974–75 (footnote omitted).
81
Tegal holds that the right to a jury trial where an “affirmative defense of invalidity”
is raised depends on the nature of the remedy the patentee seeks. Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo
Electron Am., Inc., 257 F.3d 1331, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The Lockwood court
distinguished Shubin v. United States Dist. Court, 313 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1963), because
the plaintiff in Shubin could not have sought monetary damages, whereas Lockwood
could have and, in fact, did. Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 977. The court did not, however,
explain why this made a difference since Lockwood’s infringement claim had been
dismissed. In Tegal, the plaintiff still had a right to damages, which it intentionally
waived.
78
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instance” whether a jury trial on validity would be compelled.82
The authors do not fully understand the reference to “in the first
instance.” At common law, if the patentee chose to forego
damages and institute a suit in equity, no jury trial was possible—
regardless of the infringer’s defenses. However, where the
patentee sought damages, an action at law would follow and a jury
would decide the validity of the patent. The result would not have
been altered because of declaratory judgment counterclaims—they
did not exist at common law. This “in the first instance” language
becomes more troubling since it appears to open the door for the
right to a jury trial to be dictated not by the nature of the patentee’s
action and the requested remedy, but by the alleged infringer’s
choice to assert invalidity by a counterclaim in addition to an
affirmative defense. Thus, the authors submit that the crux of the
Federal Circuit’s error stems from the following statement:
We cannot, consistent with the Seventh Amendment, deny
Lockwood that same choice merely because the validity of
his patents comes before the court in a declaratory
judgment action for invalidity rather than as a defense in an
infringement suit. Lockwood is entitled to have the factual
questions relating to validity in this case tried to a jury as a
matter of right.83
The authors submit that Lockwood had no choice because his
infringement claim had already been dismissed. If Lockwood did
not have a right to a jury trial in the “non-inverted” action, the
“inversion” occasioned by the declaratory judgment action could
not create such a right.84 Indeed, earlier in its Lockwood opinion,
82

See Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976 (“[I]f the patentee facing past acts of infringement
nevertheless sought only to enjoin future acts of infringement, the patentee could only
bring a suit in equity, and the defense of invalidity ordinarily would be tried to the
bench.” (second emphasis added)); Filmon Process Corp. v. Sirica, 379 F.2d 449, 451
(D.C. Cir. 1967) (holding that when no damages were sought, no right to a jury trial
existed).
83
Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 976. Accord Warner-Lambert Co. v. Purepac Pharm. Co., No.
CIV.A.98-2749, 2001 WL 883232, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2001); Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Inc. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363 (D.N.J. 1996).
84
In this Article, the authors do not assert, as did the alleged infringer in Lockwood,
that declaratory judgment actions are “invariably equitable,” and thus tried to the court.
Id. at 978.
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the Federal Circuit stated that if damages were not sought, the
patentee had no right to a jury. To the extent the court took the
view that because Lockwood had initially sought damages, later
developments could not affect his right to a jury, that reasoning is
contradicted by Tegal, where subsequent changes in the requested
remedy directly affected the right to a jury. Moreover, to the
extent the court implied that Lockwood would have had a choice if
the validity issue had been raised only as an affirmative defense, it
is further inconsistent with Tegal.
The authors submit that the court’s emphasis on declaratory
judgment counterclaims in Lockwood is misplaced, especially in
view of the court’s recognition that American’s action resembled
“nothing so much as” an action for patent infringement where the
affirmative defense of invalidity had been pled.85 The court’s
reliance on the declaratory judgment counterclaims necessitated
the carefully constructed opinion in Tegal, which distinguished
Lockwood on this very point.
The dissent by Judge Nies in Lockwood (in which then Chief
Judge Archer and Judge Plager joined) explored in some detail the
right to a jury trial in patent litigation. While Judge Nies disagreed
with the majority for various reasons,86 only her views regarding
the historical test and the nature of declaratory judgment actions
are pertinent to the present discussion.87 In her dissent, Judge Nies
focused on the lack of monetary damages as the key to determining
the right to a jury. “Thus, all that remains at this stage are the
declaratory judgment counterclaim[s] for invalidity and
unenforceability. Neither remaining claim carries any right to
85

See Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 974. In its discussion, the court apparently distinguishes
Shubin, because “no claim for damages could have been brought.” Id. at 977. This, the
authors submit, is a distinction without a difference, especially in light of Tegal.
86
See id. at 980–90 (Nies, J., dissenting). Judge Nies’s discussion of the public rights
and issue of law exceptions to a Seventh Amendment right is not addressed in this
Article.
87
Although the majority recognized the applicable two-part test (eighteenth century
analog and remedy), Judge Nies criticized the majority for changing the “and” to “or.”
See id. at 984 (Nies, J., dissenting). The authors submit that this change—at least in
emphasis—allowed the majority to de-emphasize the lack of monetary damages and
focus almost entirely on the purported “legal” nature of the invalidity defense. Although
this shift in emphasis may not have directly affected the majority’s decision, it made the
ruling easier to justify.
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damages. The panel decision relies solely on the challenge to
validity as the basis for the jury right.”88 Because the remedy
sought in that case was equitable, no jury trial was required. The
dissent then reviewed numerous decisions supporting the view that
the failure to seek monetary damages renders the case equitable, as
opposed to legal.
Judge Nies further noted that the Supreme Court has held that
the second part of the constitutional test, i.e., the requested remedy,
is the more important part. However, according to Judge Nies, the
majority nonetheless (and apparently surprisingly) found that a
right to a jury trial existed. Thus, Judge Nies insisted that the
majority’s analysis overlooked the fact that the patentee’s claim for
infringement had been dismissed.
She then stated that a
declaratory judgment action for invalidity is not the “flip side” of
an infringement claim, because a patentee has no possibility of
suing for a declaration of validity.89 Judge Nies’ views fully
comport with those of the authors.
After Lockwood, the Federal Circuit next addressed the right to
a jury trial in the unpublished, non-precedential opinion, In re
SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc.90
There, the patentee,
International Rectifier (IR), sued SGS-Thomson and sought only
an injunction to prohibit future infringement. SGS-Thomson
asserted affirmative defenses and counterclaimed for declaratory
judgments of non-infringement and invalidity. SGS-Thomson
demanded a jury trial on its counterclaims, which the district court
denied. On SGS-Thomson’s petition for a writ of mandamus, the
Federal Circuit reversed.91 Relying on its decision in Lockwood,
the court reasoned that if SGS-Thomson had brought an action
seeking declaratory judgments of non-infringement or invalidity,
either SGS-Thomson or IR would have had a right to a jury trial.92
The court observed that IR’s request for injunctive relief not only
88

Id. at 985 (Nies, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). There is no dispute that the
unenforceability claim is equitable. See generally Gardco Mfg., Inc. v. Herst Lighting
Co., 820 F.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
89
Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 986 (Nies, J., dissenting).
90
In re SGS-Thomson Microelectronics Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1572 (Fed. Cir.
1995) (nonprecedential opinion).
91
Id. at 1572.
92
As discussed infra Part V, this proposition is not correct.
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removed these issues from the jury, but stated that while Lockwood
mentioned the patentee’s choice of remedy in its decision, the
SGS-Thomson court “based its decision on the legal nature of the
declaratory judgment action, not the nature of the patentee’s
claim.”93 To the extent SGS-Thomson expands Lockwood to stand
for the sweeping proposition that the issues of invalidity and noninfringement are always “legal,” regardless of the patentee’s claim,
it is wrong.94
In fact, the Federal Circuit’s emphasis on the nature of the
issue as legal or equitable is not helpful. Professor Moore put it
best:
As Justice Stewart pointed out in his dissenting opinion in
Ross [v. Borchard], fact issues are not basically legal or
equitable.
They take on that coloration by the
circumstances in which they arise. Thus, in an action for
patent infringement where the plaintiff seeks no relief but
an injunction, the issue of whether the patent is valid and
infringed is no more nor less an issue that a jury could
manage than the same issue would be had the plaintiff
sought damages. The reason that in one case it would be
tried to the court and in the other to the jury lies, then, not
in the nature of the issue but in the historical development
of separate jurisdictions.95

93

SGS-Thomson, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1573 (emphasis added). This ruling is
apparently inconsistent with SRI Int’l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 775 F.2d 1107,
1127 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (A “patentee seeking only an injunction is not entitled to a trial
by jury.”). See also Nike, Inc. v. “Just Did It” Enters., 32 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1061
(N.D. Ill. 1994).
94
See Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 973 (“[D]eclaratory judgment actions are, for Seventh
Amendment purposes, only as legal or equitable in nature as the controversies on which
they are founded.”); BORCHARD, supra note 65, at 239 (stating that an action for
declaratory judgment “is as much legal as equitable.”).
95
8 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 38App.106[4], at
38App.–30 (3d ed. 2002). No prohibition ever prevented a court of equity from deciding
questions of validity and infringement. See, e.g., Silsby v. Foote, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 378
(1858); Goodyear v. Day, 10 F. Cas. 678 (C.C.D.N.J. 1852) (Case No. 5,566); Fuller &
Johnson Mfg. Co. v. Stephens, 59 F. 157 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1893). See generally Cochrane
v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 783 (1876). Only in actions at law were these issues necessarily
tried to a jury. See, e.g., United States v. Esnault-Pelterie, 299 U.S. 201, 205 (1936);
Tucker v. Spalding, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 453, 455 (1871).
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Put simply, “[a]n ‘issue’ does not exist in a vacuum and its
characterization . . . may be determined only by reference to the
‘claim’ to which it is pertinent. If there are no legal claims in a suit
then there are no legal issues warranting a right to a jury trial.”96
Thus, if legal relief is not requested, a right to a jury trial does not
exist, regardless of counterclaims for invalidity or noninfringement.
V. IN A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION FOR INVALIDITY OR
NON-INFRINGEMENT, THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IS DICTATED BY
THE PATENTEE’S CHOICE OF REMEDY
Declaratory judgment actions, unknown at common law, are a
recent procedural development that facilitate the adjudication of
controversies.97 As explained by Professor Borchard, patentees
could threaten alleged infringers with infringement actions but
never institute suit, thereby denying the accused infringer its day in
court.98 The Declaratory Judgment Act (hereinafter the “Act”),99
passed in 1934, changed this practice and provided the alleged
infringer with a procedure to test the validity and infringement of
the asserted patent.100 Indeed, the Act is entitled “Creation of
remedy.”101 As such, it is clear that the Act did not extend the
jurisdiction of the federal courts. Instead it simply provided a
procedure for, inter alia, the accused infringer to institute suit.

96

Owens-Ill., Inc. v. Lake Shore Land Co., 610 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1979). See
also Gardo Mfg. Inc. v. Herst Lighting Co., 820 F.2d 1209, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (factual
disputes arising in an equitable claim are not decided by a jury).
97
Part of the difficulty in analyzing suits under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2201, versus possible historical analogs in eighteenth century England is that a
mere four years after the Act was passed, the merger of law and equity occurred. Thus,
case law under the Act regarding actions at law and suits in equity was still developing
when the merger took place, further compounding an already confusing area of law. It
has been observed that in that four-year period every reported action for a declaration of
patent invalidity was instituted in a court of equity. See Coggio & Bresnick, supra note
17, at 271 n.100.
98
See BORCHARD, supra note 65, at 803; see also Zenie Bros. v. Miskend, 10 F. Supp.
779, 781 (S.D.N.Y. 1935).
99
28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000).
100
See BORCHARD, supra note 65, at 804–06.
101
28 U.S.C. § 2201.
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In Lockwood, the Federal Circuit suggested that a declaratory
judgment action is merely the “inversion” of an action for patent
infringement and that “such an inversion cannot operate to
frustrate Lockwood’s Seventh Amendment rights.”102
Under Rule 57 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a right
to a jury trial exists if that right would have existed in the kind of
action in which the pertinent issue would have been decided if a
declaratory judgment procedure did not exist.
As such,
“declaratory judgment actions are, for Seventh Amendment
purposes, only as legal or equitable as the controversies on which
they are founded.”103 The same is true in patent infringement
actions. As a result, reference to the questions of patent validity or
infringement as “legal” or “equitable” is not helpful in identifying
“the decision maker.”
Because the issues of validity and infringement in declaratory
judgment actions are neither legal nor equitable, the declaratory
judgment plaintiff must await the defendant’s answer and
counterclaims before knowing whether a right to a jury trial
exists.104 The leading treatises concur; for example, Professors
Wright and Miller state:
An action for a declaratory judgment with regard to patents
or copyrights will give rise to a right to a trial by jury if
there would have been such a right in the coercive action
that otherwise would have been required. Although there
may be no right to a jury in the rare cases in which all that
is sought is a declaration that the defendant’s patent is
invalid or not infringed, if the defendant counterclaims and
asks for damages for infringement of the patent, either

102
In re Lockwood, 50 F.3d 966, 976 (Fed. Cir.), vacated by sub nom., Am. Airlines v.
Lockwood, 515 U.S. 1182 (1995).
103
Lockwood, 50 F.3d at 973. See also 8 MOORE, supra note 95, § 38App.106[1], at
38App.–24.
104
As Professor Moore emphasizes: “The basic nature of the issue in patent litigation
was also dependent upon the patentee’s choice of remedy: an action by the patentee
under . . . former 35 U.S.C. § 70 for an injunction and damages presented equitable
issues.” 8 MOORE, supra note 95, § 38App.106[1], at 38App.–22. The nature of the
issue, e.g., whether the patent-in-suit is valid or invalid, does not change depending on
the relief sought.
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alone or in addition to other relief, there is a right to jury
trial on the legal demands in the counterclaim.105
Thus, the right to a jury trial rests with the patentee. In addition,
the issues of validity and infringement raised in the declaratory
judgment complaint are no more “legal” or “equitable” than the
same issues when raised by an infringer as an affirmative defense
in an action for patent infringement. In both instances, the trier of
fact is dictated by the patentee’s choice of remedy. As Professor
Moore explains:
These general principles applied where the alleged
infringer took the initiative and sought declaratory relief
against the patentee, and the patentee counterclaimed. The
nature of the patentee’s counterclaim, whether legal or
equitable, would determine the basic nature of the issue in
the case.106
The case law agrees. For example, General Motors Corp. v.
California Research Corp107 was a declaratory judgment action for
invalidity and non-infringement.
Defendant interposed a
counterclaim for infringement, sought damages and requested a
jury trial. Plaintiff moved to strike, which was denied. The court
noted that prior to the Act, infringement actions could only be
litigated “at the instance of the patentee and, at his option, could be
by legal action or in equity.”108 Because the patentee had sought
damages, a right to jury trial existed. In contrast, where no
counterclaim for damages is interposed, the case must be tried to
the court.109
105

CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL 2D § 2312, at 107 (1994) (citations omitted).
106
See 8 MOORE, supra note 95, § 38App.106[1] at App. 22 (emphasis added). See also
GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HASEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 105, at
457 (2d ed. 1994) (footnotes omitted) (“In the usual reversed parties case, this [jury trial]
inquiry would require application of the modified historical test for the right to jury trial
to the action that the declaratory judgment defendant would have brought had not the
declaratory judgment plaintiff filed first.”).
107
9 F.R.D. 565 (D. Del. 1949).
108
Id. at 566 (emphasis added).
109
See Inland Steel Prods. Co. v. MPH Mfg. Corp., 25 F.R.D. 238, 245 (N.D. Ill. 1959)
(“[P]rior to the enactment of the Declaratory Judgment Act . . . , the patentee had the
choice of suing at law or in equity; his choice of remedy still controls the nature of his
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Quite possibly, however, the most informative decision did not
involve patents at all. In Beacon Theatres v. Westover,110 plaintiff
instituted suit seeking a declaration that its conduct did not violate
the antitrust laws and an injunction preventing defendant Beacon
from instituting an antitrust action. Beacon filed a counterclaim
for treble damages and demanded a jury trial.111 The Court held
that since the counterclaim for treble damages would have entitled
Beacon to a jury trial if it had brought the action at law, Beacon
“cannot be deprived of that right merely because [plaintiff] took
advantage of the availability of declaratory relief to sue Beacon
first.”112 As Justice Stewart stated in his dissent, “[i]f the complaint
had been answered simply by a general denial, therefore, the issues
would under traditional principles have been triable as a
proceeding in equity.”113 Indeed, in essentially the last sentence of
the dissenting opinion, Justice Stewart specifically addressed the
right to a jury in patent declaratory judgment actions. He
instructed:
Determination of whether a claim stated by the complaint is
triable by the court or by a jury will normally not be
dependent upon the “legal” or “equitable” character of the
counterclaim. There are situations, however, such as a case
action.”); Hall v. Kish, 11 F.R.D. 292, 293 (N.D. Ohio 1951); Brody v. Kafka, 73
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Ryan Distrib. Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377,
379 (E.D. Pa. 1943) (“There are numerous cases holding that the patent holder has his
election as to the form of action and therefore the right to a jury trial.”). But see
Minnesota Auto., Inc. v. Stromberg Hydraulic Brake & Coupling Co., 167 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 165, 166 (D. Minn. 1970) (ordering a jury trial in a patent declaratory judgment
action even though no claim for damages was asserted; according to the court, the factual
issues required a jury trial, even though the basic issues were “equitable”).
110
359 U.S. 500 (1959). For further discussion of the Beacon Theatre decision, see
John C. McCoid II, Procedural Reform and the Right to Jury Trial: A Study of Beacon
Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1967); Martin H. Redish, Seventh
Amendment Right to Jury Trial: A Study in the Irrationality of Rational Decision Making,
70 NW. U. L. REV. 486 (1975).
111
Beacon Theaters, 359 U.S. at 503.
112
Id. at 504. See also Gary M. Ropski, Constitutional and Procedural Aspects of the
Use of Juries in Patent Litigation (Part I), 58 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 609, 618 (1976) (Under
Beacon Theatres, the “right to jury trial depends upon the legal or equitable nature of the
counterclaim.”). Ropski notes that Beacon Theaters was foreshadowed by Ryan Distrib.
Corp. v. Caley, 51 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Pa. 1943), a declaratory judgment action in which
the defendant-patentee counterclaimed for damages. There, a right to a jury trial existed.
113
Beacon Theatres, 359 U.S. at 512 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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in which the plaintiff seeks a declaration of invalidity or
noninfringement of a patent, in which the relief sought by
the counterclaim will determine the nature of the entire
case.114
The authors fully agree with Justice Stewart’s observations, which
were not affected by the majority opinion. So does Chief Judge
Robinson of the District of Delaware. In Rhenalu v. Alcoa, Inc.,115
plaintiff Rhenalu filed a declaratory judgment action seeking
rulings of invalidity and non-infringement of defendant Alcoa’s
patent, as well as a claim for tortuous interference. Alcoa filed a
counterclaim for infringement and requested both damages and an
injunction.116 The parties later stipulated that all requests for
monetary damages were withdrawn and that “no monetary relief
(including damages) will be sought in this litigation.”117 The case
was tried to a jury and the patent was held valid and infringed.
Based upon the then recently-decided Tegal case, plaintiff moved
to vacate the judgment based on the jury verdict. In a one-page
order the court granted the motion stating: “Pursuant to the Federal
Circuit’s decision in Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron America, Inc.,
given that defendant-patentee voluntarily withdrew its claim for
damages it also waived its right to a jury trial.”118 The court rested
the right to a jury trial on the patentee’s counterclaim. Lacking a
counterclaim for damages, the patentee had no right to have the
infringement or validity of the patent decided by a jury. Thus,
even in a declaratory judgment action the right to a jury trial
depends on the remedy selected by the patentee.
While this conclusion is consistent with Tegal, it conflicts with
Lockwood. The declaratory judgment action in Rhenalu, which
seeks a ruling of invalidity, is the functional equivalent of the
counterclaim for invalidity in Lockwood. If Tegal, at least
according to the Delaware court, dictates that the patentee in
Rhenalu had no right to a jury trial, then the patentee in Lockwood
equally had no such right.
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at 519 n.13 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
No. Civ. A. 99-301, 2000 WL 1868178 (D. Del. Dec. 14, 2000).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1 n.1.
Order, September 28, 2001 (citation omitted) (unpublished).
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CONCLUSION
In light of the Federal Circuit’s decision in Tegal, its earlier
decisions in Lockwood and SGS-Thomson should, at a minimum,
be revisited. Whether the reader agrees or disagrees with the views
expressed by the authors, hopefully this Article will spur
discussion that will lead to that reevaluation.

